AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces is no longer open to new customers as of November 7, 2025. For capabilities similar to AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces, explore [AWS Transform](https://aws.amazon.com/transform). # Identity and Access Management for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces Identity and Access Management AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) is an AWS service that helps an administrator securely control access to AWS resources. IAM administrators control who can be *authenticated* (signed in) and *authorized* (have permissions) to use Refactor Spaces resources. IAM is an AWS service that you can use with no additional charge. **Topics** + [ ## Audience ](#security_iam_audience) + [ ## Authenticating with identities ](#security_iam_authentication) + [ ## Managing access using policies ](#security_iam_access-manage) + [ # How AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces works with IAM ](security_iam_service-with-iam.md) + [ # AWS managed policies for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces ](security-iam-awsmanpol.md) + [ # Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces ](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md) + [ # Troubleshooting AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces identity and access ](security_iam_troubleshoot.md) + [ # Using service-linked roles for Refactor Spaces ](using-service-linked-roles.md) ## Audience How you use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) differs based on your role: + **Service user** - request permissions from your administrator if you cannot access features (see [Troubleshooting AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces identity and access](security_iam_troubleshoot.md)) + **Service administrator** - determine user access and submit permission requests (see [How AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces works with IAM](security_iam_service-with-iam.md)) + **IAM administrator** - write policies to manage access (see [Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md)) ## Authenticating with identities Authentication is how you sign in to AWS using your identity credentials. You must be authenticated as the AWS account root user, an IAM user, or by assuming an IAM role. You can sign in as a federated identity using credentials from an identity source like AWS IAM Identity Center (IAM Identity Center), single sign-on authentication, or Google/Facebook credentials. For more information about signing in, see [How to sign in to your AWS account](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/signin/latest/userguide/how-to-sign-in.html) in the *AWS Sign-In User Guide*. For programmatic access, AWS provides an SDK and CLI to cryptographically sign requests. For more information, see [AWS Signature Version 4 for API requests](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### AWS account root user When you create an AWS account, you begin with one sign-in identity called the AWS account *root user* that has complete access to all AWS services and resources. We strongly recommend that you don't use the root user for everyday tasks. For tasks that require root user credentials, see [Tasks that require root user credentials](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html#root-user-tasks) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### Federated identity As a best practice, require human users to use federation with an identity provider to access AWS services using temporary credentials. A *federated identity* is a user from your enterprise directory, web identity provider, or Directory Service that accesses AWS services using credentials from an identity source. Federated identities assume roles that provide temporary credentials. For centralized access management, we recommend AWS IAM Identity Center. For more information, see [What is IAM Identity Center?](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/what-is.html) in the *AWS IAM Identity Center User Guide*. ### IAM users and groups An *[IAM user](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users.html)* is an identity with specific permissions for a single person or application. We recommend using temporary credentials instead of IAM users with long-term credentials. For more information, see [Require human users to use federation with an identity provider to access AWS using temporary credentials](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#bp-users-federation-idp) in the *IAM User Guide*. An [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_groups.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_groups.html) specifies a collection of IAM users and makes permissions easier to manage for large sets of users. For more information, see [Use cases for IAM users](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/gs-identities-iam-users.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### IAM roles An *[IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles.html)* is an identity with specific permissions that provides temporary credentials. You can assume a role by [switching from a user to an IAM role (console)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-console.html) or by calling an AWS CLI or AWS API operation. For more information, see [Methods to assume a role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_manage-assume.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. IAM roles are useful for federated user access, temporary IAM user permissions, cross-account access, cross-service access, and applications running on Amazon EC2. For more information, see [Cross account resource access in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies-cross-account-resource-access.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Managing access using policies You control access in AWS by creating policies and attaching them to AWS identities or resources. A policy defines permissions when associated with an identity or resource. AWS evaluates these policies when a principal makes a request. Most policies are stored in AWS as JSON documents. For more information about JSON policy documents, see [Overview of JSON policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#access_policies-json) in the *IAM User Guide*. Using policies, administrators specify who has access to what by defining which **principal** can perform **actions** on what **resources**, and under what **conditions**. By default, users and roles have no permissions. An IAM administrator creates IAM policies and adds them to roles, which users can then assume. IAM policies define permissions regardless of the method used to perform the operation. ### Identity-based policies Identity-based policies are JSON permissions policy documents that you attach to an identity (user, group, or role). These policies control what actions identities can perform, on which resources, and under what conditions. To learn how to create an identity-based policy, see [Define custom IAM permissions with customer managed policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_create.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. Identity-based policies can be *inline policies* (embedded directly into a single identity) or *managed policies* (standalone policies attached to multiple identities). To learn how to choose between managed and inline policies, see [Choose between managed policies and inline policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies-choosing-managed-or-inline.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### Resource-based policies Resource-based policies are JSON policy documents that you attach to a resource. Examples include IAM *role trust policies* and Amazon S3 *bucket policies*. In services that support resource-based policies, service administrators can use them to control access to a specific resource. You must [specify a principal](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_principal.html) in a resource-based policy. Resource-based policies are inline policies that are located in that service. You can't use AWS managed policies from IAM in a resource-based policy. ### Other policy types AWS supports additional policy types that can set the maximum permissions granted by more common policy types: + **Permissions boundaries** – Set the maximum permissions that an identity-based policy can grant to an IAM entity. For more information, see [Permissions boundaries for IAM entities](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + **Service control policies (SCPs)** – Specify the maximum permissions for an organization or organizational unit in AWS Organizations. For more information, see [Service control policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html) in the *AWS Organizations User Guide*. + **Resource control policies (RCPs)** – Set the maximum available permissions for resources in your accounts. For more information, see [Resource control policies (RCPs)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_rcps.html) in the *AWS Organizations User Guide*. + **Session policies** – Advanced policies passed as a parameter when creating a temporary session for a role or federated user. For more information, see [Session policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### Multiple policy types When multiple types of policies apply to a request, the resulting permissions are more complicated to understand. To learn how AWS determines whether to allow a request when multiple policy types are involved, see [Policy evaluation logic](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_evaluation-logic.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. # How AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces works with IAM Before you use IAM to manage access to Refactor Spaces, learn what IAM features are available to use with Refactor Spaces. **IAM features you can use with AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces** | IAM feature | Refactor Spaces support | | --- | --- | | [Identity-based policies](#security_iam_service-with-iam-id-based-policies) | Yes | | [Resource-based policies](#security_iam_service-with-iam-resource-based-policies) | Yes | | [Policy actions](#security_iam_service-with-iam-id-based-policies-actions) | Yes | | [Policy resources](#security_iam_service-with-iam-id-based-policies-resources) | Yes | | [Policy condition keys](#security_iam_service-with-iam-id-based-policies-conditionkeys) | Yes | | [ACLs](#security_iam_service-with-iam-acls) | No | | [ABAC (tags in policies)](#security_iam_service-with-iam-tags) | Partial | | [Temporary credentials](#security_iam_service-with-iam-roles-tempcreds) | Yes | | [Principal permissions](#security_iam_service-with-iam-principal-permissions) | Yes | | [Service roles](#security_iam_service-with-iam-roles-service) | No | | [Service-linked roles](#security_iam_service-with-iam-roles-service-linked) | Yes | To get a high-level view of how Refactor Spaces and other AWS services work with most IAM features, see [AWS services that work with IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Identity-based policies for Refactor Spaces Identity-based policies **Supports identity-based policies:** Yes Identity-based policies are JSON permissions policy documents that you can attach to an identity, such as an IAM user, group of users, or role. These policies control what actions users and roles can perform, on which resources, and under what conditions. To learn how to create an identity-based policy, see [Define custom IAM permissions with customer managed policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_create.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. With IAM identity-based policies, you can specify allowed or denied actions and resources as well as the conditions under which actions are allowed or denied. To learn about all of the elements that you can use in a JSON policy, see [IAM JSON policy elements reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ### Identity-based policy examples for Refactor Spaces To view examples of Refactor Spaces identity-based policies, see [Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md). ## Resource-based policies within Refactor Spaces Resource-based policies **Supports resource-based policies:** Yes Resource-based policies are JSON policy documents that you attach to a resource. Examples of resource-based policies are IAM *role trust policies* and Amazon S3 *bucket policies*. In services that support resource-based policies, service administrators can use them to control access to a specific resource. For the resource where the policy is attached, the policy defines what actions a specified principal can perform on that resource and under what conditions. You must [specify a principal](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_principal.html) in a resource-based policy. Principals can include accounts, users, roles, federated users, or AWS services. To enable cross-account access, you can specify an entire account or IAM entities in another account as the principal in a resource-based policy. For more information, see [Cross account resource access in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies-cross-account-resource-access.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Policy actions for Refactor Spaces Policy actions **Supports policy actions:** Yes Administrators can use AWS JSON policies to specify who has access to what. That is, which **principal** can perform **actions** on what **resources**, and under what **conditions**. The `Action` element of a JSON policy describes the actions that you can use to allow or deny access in a policy. Include actions in a policy to grant permissions to perform the associated operation. To see a list of Refactor Spaces actions, see [Actions defined by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html#awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces-actions-as-permissions) in the *Service Authorization Reference*. Policy actions in Refactor Spaces use the following prefix before the action: ``` refactor-spaces ``` To specify multiple actions in a single statement, separate them with commas. ``` "Action": [ "refactor-spaces:action1", "refactor-spaces:action2" ] ``` To view examples of Refactor Spaces identity-based policies, see [Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md). ## Policy resources for Refactor Spaces Policy resources **Supports policy resources:** Yes Administrators can use AWS JSON policies to specify who has access to what. That is, which **principal** can perform **actions** on what **resources**, and under what **conditions**. The `Resource` JSON policy element specifies the object or objects to which the action applies. As a best practice, specify a resource using its [Amazon Resource Name (ARN)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference-arns.html). For actions that don't support resource-level permissions, use a wildcard (\$1) to indicate that the statement applies to all resources. ``` "Resource": "*" ``` To see a list of Refactor Spaces resource types and their ARNs, see [Resources defined by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html#awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces-resources-for-iam-policies) in the *Service Authorization Reference*. To learn with which actions you can specify the ARN of each resource, see [Actions defined by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html#awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces-actions-as-permissions). To view examples of Refactor Spaces identity-based policies, see [Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md). ## Policy condition keys for Refactor Spaces Policy condition keys **Supports service-specific policy condition keys:** Yes Administrators can use AWS JSON policies to specify who has access to what. That is, which **principal** can perform **actions** on what **resources**, and under what **conditions**. The `Condition` element specifies when statements execute based on defined criteria. You can create conditional expressions that use [condition operators](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition_operators.html), such as equals or less than, to match the condition in the policy with values in the request. To see all AWS global condition keys, see [AWS global condition context keys](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_condition-keys.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. To see a list of Refactor Spaces condition keys, see [Condition keys for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html#awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces-policy-keys) in the *Service Authorization Reference*. To learn with which actions and resources you can use a condition key, see [Actions defined by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html#awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces-actions-as-permissions). To view examples of Refactor Spaces identity-based policies, see [Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](security_iam_id-based-policy-examples.md). ## Access control lists (ACLs) in Refactor Spaces ACLs **Supports ACLs:** No Access control lists (ACLs) control which principals (account members, users, or roles) have permissions to access a resource. ACLs are similar to resource-based policies, although they do not use the JSON policy document format. ## Attribute-based access control (ABAC) with Refactor Spaces ABAC **Supports ABAC (tags in policies):** Partial Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is an authorization strategy that defines permissions based on attributes called tags. You can attach tags to IAM entities and AWS resources, then design ABAC policies to allow operations when the principal's tag matches the tag on the resource. To control access based on tags, you provide tag information in the [condition element](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html) of a policy using the `aws:ResourceTag/key-name`, `aws:RequestTag/key-name`, or `aws:TagKeys` condition keys. If a service supports all three condition keys for every resource type, then the value is **Yes** for the service. If a service supports all three condition keys for only some resource types, then the value is **Partial**. For more information about ABAC, see [Define permissions with ABAC authorization](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/introduction_attribute-based-access-control.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. To view a tutorial with steps for setting up ABAC, see [Use attribute-based access control (ABAC)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/tutorial_attribute-based-access-control.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Using Temporary credentials with Refactor Spaces Temporary credentials **Supports temporary credentials:** Yes Temporary credentials provide short-term access to AWS resources and are automatically created when you use federation or switch roles. AWS recommends that you dynamically generate temporary credentials instead of using long-term access keys. For more information, see [Temporary security credentials in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp.html) and [AWS services that work with IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Cross-service principal permissions for Refactor Spaces Principal permissions **Supports forward access sessions (FAS):** Yes Forward access sessions (FAS) use the permissions of the principal calling an AWS service, combined with the requesting AWS service to make requests to downstream services. For policy details when making FAS requests, see [Forward access sessions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_forward_access_sessions.html). ## Service roles for Refactor Spaces Service roles **Supports service roles:** No A service role is an [IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles.html) that a service assumes to perform actions on your behalf. An IAM administrator can create, modify, and delete a service role from within IAM. For more information, see [Create a role to delegate permissions to an AWS service](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-service.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. **Warning** Changing the permissions for a service role might break Refactor Spaces functionality. Edit service roles only when Refactor Spaces provides guidance to do so. ## Service-linked roles for Refactor Spaces Service-linked roles **Supports service-linked roles:** Yes A service-linked role is a type of service role that is linked to an AWS service. The service can assume the role to perform an action on your behalf. Service-linked roles appear in your AWS account and are owned by the service. An IAM administrator can view, but not edit the permissions for service-linked roles. For details about creating or managing service-linked roles, see [AWS services that work with IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html). Find a service in the table that includes a `Yes` in the **Service-linked role** column. Choose the **Yes** link to view the service-linked role documentation for that service. # AWS managed policies for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces AWS managed policies To add permissions to users, groups, and roles, it is easier to use AWS managed policies than to write policies yourself. It takes time and expertise to [create IAM customer managed policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_create-console.html) that provide your team with only the permissions they need. To get started quickly, you can use our AWS managed policies. These policies cover common use cases and are available in your AWS account. For more information about AWS managed policies, see [AWS managed policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html#aws-managed-policies) in the *IAM User Guide*. AWS services maintain and update AWS managed policies. You can't change the permissions in AWS managed policies. Services occasionally add additional permissions to an AWS managed policy to support new features. This type of update affects all identities (users, groups, and roles) where the policy is attached. Services are most likely to update an AWS managed policy when a new feature is launched or when new operations become available. Services do not remove permissions from an AWS managed policy, so policy updates won't break your existing permissions. ## AWS managed policy: AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess You can attach the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy to a role that users can assume. The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy grants full access to AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces, the Refactor Spaces console features and other related AWS services. **Permissions details** The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy includes the following permissions. + `refactor-spaces` – Allows the user full access to Refactor Spaces. + `ec2` – Allows the user to perform Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `elasticloadbalancing` – Allows the user to perform Elastic Load Balancing operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `apigateway` – Allows the user to perform Amazon API Gateway operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `organizations` – Allows the user to perform AWS Organizations operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `cloudformation` – Allows the user to perform AWS CloudFormation operations to create a one-click sample environment from the console. + `iam` – Allows a service-linked role to be created for the user, which is a requirement for using Refactor Spaces. ### Extra required permissions for Refactor Spaces Before you can use Refactor Spaces, in addition to the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` managed policy provided by Refactor Spaces, the following extra required permissions must be attached to a role that users can assume. + Grant permission to create a service-linked role for AWS Transit Gateway. + Grant permission to attach a virtual private cloud (VPC) to a transit gateway for the calling account for all resources. + Grant permission to modify the permissions for a VPC endpoint service for all resources. + Grant permission to add or overwrite specified tags for Amazon EC2 resources. + Grant permission to return tagged or previously tagged resources for the calling account for all resources. + Grant permission to perform all AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM) actions for the calling account on all resources. + Grant permission to perform all AWS Lambda actions for the calling account on all resources. You can get these extra permissions by creating an IAM policy using the following policy JSON, and attach it to a role. The following policy grants the extra required permissions necessary to be able to use Refactor Spaces. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "iam:AWSServiceName": "transitgateway.amazonaws.com" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTransitGatewayVpcAttachment" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:ModifyVpcEndpointServicePermissions" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "tag:GetResources" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ram:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "lambda:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTags" ], "Resource": "*" } ] } ``` The following is the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "RefactorSpaces", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "refactor-spaces:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "EC2Describe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces", "ec2:DescribeRouteTables", "ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups", "ec2:DescribeSubnets", "ec2:DescribeVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "ec2:DescribeVpcs", "ec2:DescribeTransitGatewayVpcAttachments", "ec2:DescribeTransitGateways", "ec2:DescribeTags", "ec2:DescribeAccountAttributes", "ec2:DescribeInternetGateways" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "RequestTagTransitGatewayCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTransitGateway", "ec2:CreateSecurityGroup", "ec2:CreateTransitGatewayVpcAttachment" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:environment-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ResourceTagTransitGatewayCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTransitGateway", "ec2:CreateSecurityGroup", "ec2:CreateTransitGatewayVpcAttachment" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:environment-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "VpcEndpointServiceConfigurationCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateVpcEndpointServiceConfiguration" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "EC2NetworkingModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DeleteTransitGateway", "ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress", "ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupIngress", "ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup", "ec2:DeleteTransitGatewayVpcAttachment", "ec2:CreateRoute", "ec2:DeleteRoute", "ec2:DeleteTags" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:environment-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "VpcEndpointServiceConfigurationDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "ec2:DeleteVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBLoadBalancerCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancer" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBDescribe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeLoadBalancers", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTags", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetHealth", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetGroups", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeListeners" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "ELBModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancerListeners", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringLike": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": [ "*" ] } } }, { "Sid": "ELBLoadBalancerDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteLoadBalancer", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBListenerCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener" ], "Resource": [ "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*", "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" ], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBListenerDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBTargetGroupModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup", "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBTargetGroupCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "APIGatewayModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "apigateway:GET", "apigateway:DELETE", "apigateway:PATCH", "apigateway:POST", "apigateway:PUT", "apigateway:UpdateRestApiPolicy" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags/*" ], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "APIGatewayVpcLinksGet", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "apigateway:GET", "Resource": [ "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*" ] }, { "Sid": "OrganizationDescribe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "organizations:DescribeOrganization" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "CloudformationStackCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "cloudformation:CreateStack" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "CloudformationStackTag", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "cloudformation:TagResource" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:cloudformation:*:*:stack/*" }, { "Sid": "CreateRefactorSpacesSLR", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "iam:AWSServiceName": "refactor-spaces.amazonaws.com" } } }, { "Sid": "CreateELBSLR", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "iam:AWSServiceName": "elasticloadbalancing.amazonaws.com" } } } ] } ``` ## AWS managed policy: AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess This AWS managed policy has reduced permissions when compared to the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy. You can attach the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` policy to a role that users can assume. You can use the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` policy when you create environments without a network bridge. Since you are using your own network infrastructure, the modified policy removes Transit Gateway permissions and Amazon EC2 security groups related to Transit Gateway actions. **Permissions details** The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` policy includes the following permissions. + `refactor-spaces` – Allows the user full access to Refactor Spaces. + `ec2` – Allows the user to perform Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `elasticloadbalancing` – Allows the user to perform Elastic Load Balancing operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `apigateway` – Allows the user to perform Amazon API Gateway operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `organizations` – Allows the user to perform AWS Organizations operations used by Refactor Spaces. + `cloudformation` – Allows the user to perform AWS CloudFormation operations to create a one-click sample environment from the console. + `iam` – Allows a service-linked role to be created for the user, which is a requirement for using Refactor Spaces. ### Extra required permissions policy for environments without a network bridge The following policy is an example of a modified version of the extra required permissions policy that you must use together with the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` policy when creating environments without a Transit Gateway. To use this policy, create a role and attach the policy to the role. + Grant permission to modify the permissions for a virtual private cloud (VPC) endpoint for all resources. + Grant permission to add or overwrite specified tags for Amazon EC2 resources. + Grant permission to return tagged or previously tagged resources for the calling account for all resources. + Grant permission to perform all AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM) actions for the calling account on all resources. + Grant permission to perform all AWS Lambda actions for the calling account on all resources. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:ModifyVpcEndpointServicePermissions" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "tag:GetResources" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ram:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "lambda:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTags" ], "Resource": "*" } ] } ``` The following is the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` managed policy that you can use when creating environments without a Transit Gateway. To use this policy, create a role and attach the policy to the role. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "RefactorSpaces", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "refactor-spaces:*" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "EC2Describe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DescribeSubnets", "ec2:DescribeVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "ec2:DescribeVpcs", "ec2:DescribeTags", "ec2:DescribeAccountAttributes", "ec2:DescribeInternetGateways" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "VpcEndpointServiceConfigurationCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateVpcEndpointServiceConfiguration" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "EC2TagsDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DeleteTags" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:environment-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "VpcEndpointServiceConfigurationDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "ec2:DeleteVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBLoadBalancerCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancer" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBDescribe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeLoadBalancers", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTags", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetHealth", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetGroups", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeListeners" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "ELBModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancerListeners", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringLike": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": [ "*" ] } } }, { "Sid": "ELBLoadBalancerDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteLoadBalancer", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBListenerCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener" ], "Resource": [ "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*", "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" ], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "ELBListenerDelete", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBTargetGroupModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup", "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*" }, { "Sid": "ELBTargetGroupCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "APIGatewayModify", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "apigateway:GET", "apigateway:DELETE", "apigateway:PATCH", "apigateway:POST", "apigateway:PUT", "apigateway:UpdateRestApiPolicy" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags/*" ], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Sid": "APIGatewayVpcLinksGet", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "apigateway:GET", "Resource": [ "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*" ] }, { "Sid": "OrganizationDescribe", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "organizations:DescribeOrganization" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "CloudformationStackCreate", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "cloudformation:CreateStack" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "CloudformationStackTag", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "cloudformation:TagResource" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:cloudformation:*:*:stack/*" }, { "Sid": "CreateRefactorSpacesSLR", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "iam:AWSServiceName": "refactor-spaces.amazonaws.com" } } }, { "Sid": "CreateELBSLR", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "iam:AWSServiceName": "elasticloadbalancing.amazonaws.com" } } } ] } ``` ## AWS managed policy: AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy To grant the permissions that are required to run SSM Automation, use this AWS managed policy in the IAM service role passed to the `AWSRefactorSpaces-CreateResources` automation document. This policy grants read and write access to tags to track the progress of the automation. When the Refactor Spaces environment’s network bridge is enabled, the automation also adds the environment’s security group to the Amazon EC2 instance to permit traffic from other Refactor Spaces services in the environment. This policy also grants access to the SSM parameters of the Application Migration Service post-launch action. **Important** When you use the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy` managed policy, the role must also use either [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess) or [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess), along with the extra required permissions that are described under these two policies. **Permissions details** The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy` policy includes the following permissions. + `ec2:DescribeInstanceStatus` – required to validate that the Amazon EC2 instance exists. + `ec2:CreateTags` and `ec2:DeleteTags` – required for tagging the Amazon EC2 instance. Tagging is needed for the automation to check if the script has already run against the Amazon EC2 instance. Deletion is needed for rollback in case of errors. + `ec2:DescribeInstances` – required for the script to fetch all the security groups that are attached to an instance. + `ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute` – required when the Refactor Spaces environment’s network bridge is enabled. This permission allows the script to add the environment’s security group to the Amazon EC2 instance to permit traffic from other Refactor Spaces services in the environment. + `ssm:GetParameters` – required to get the user-provided input values that are stored in the SSM parameter store. The following is the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy` that you need to use in the IAM role that you pass to the SSM automation document `AWSRefactorSpaces-CreateResources` to grant the permissions that are required to run the automation. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DescribeInstanceStatus", "ec2:DescribeInstances" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:ssm:optin": "true" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:security-group/*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:CreateTags", "ec2:DeleteTags" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:ssm:optin": "true" }, "ForAllValues:StringEquals": { "aws:TagKeys": "refactor-spaces:ssm:environment-id" } } }, { "Action": "ssm:GetParameters", "Resource": "arn:aws:ssm:*:*:parameter/ManagedByAWSApplicationMigrationService-*", "Effect": "Allow" } ] } ``` ## Refactor Spaces updates to AWS managed policies Policy updates View details about updates to AWS managed policies for Refactor Spaces since this service began tracking these changes. For automatic alerts about changes to this page, subscribe to the RSS feed on the Refactor Spaces Document history page. | Change | Description | Date | | --- | --- | --- | | Updated the [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess ](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess) and [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess) policies to allow the cloudformation:TagResource action. | To accommodate a change in CloudFormation, the two policies now allow the cloudformation:TagResource action. | April 11, 2024 | | [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-SSMAutomationPolicy](#SSMAutomationPolicy) – New policy | To grant the permissions that are required to run SSM Automation, use this AWS managed policy in the IAM service role passed to the `AWSRefactorSpaces-CreateResources` automation document. | August 10, 2023 | | Changed the resource element in statements that have the following action element: 
"Action": ["elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener"]
This change affects [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess), [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess), and [MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy](using-service-linked-roles.md#slr-permissions-iam-policy). | Updated NLB permissions to work with ELBv2 IAM changes. | July 20, 2023 | | [AWS managed policy: AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess) – Added the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` managed policy that you use when creating environments without a Transit Gateway. | Use the `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpaces-EnvironmentsWithoutBridgesFullAccess` policy when you create environments without a network bridge. Since you are using your own network infrastructure, the modified policy Transit Gateway permissions and Amazon EC2 security groups related to Transit Gateway actions. | April 3, 2023 | | [MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy](using-service-linked-roles.md#slr-permissions-iam-policy) – Added the Elastic Load Balancing `DeregisterTargets` permission to the policy. | `MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy` provides access to AWS resources managed or used by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces. The `AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces` service-linked role uses this policy. | October 28, 2022 | | [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess) – Added Elastic Load Balancing tagging permissions. | The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy grants full access to Refactor Spaces, the Refactor Spaces console features and other related AWS services. | October 6, 2022 | | [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess) – Removed the permission for creating tags for Amazon EC2 instances. This permission was added to [Extra required permissions for Refactor Spaces](#security-iam-awsmanpol-extra-permissions). | The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy grants full access to Refactor Spaces, the Refactor Spaces console features and other related AWS services. | March 21, 2022 | | [AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess) – New policy made available at launch | The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` policy grants full access to Refactor Spaces, the Refactor Spaces console features and other related AWS services. | November 29, 2021 | | [MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy](using-service-linked-roles.md#slr-permissions) – New policy made available at launch | `MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy` provides access to AWS resources managed or used by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces. The `AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces` service-linked role uses this policy. | November 29, 2021 | | Refactor Spaces started tracking changes | Refactor Spaces started tracking changes for its AWS managed policies. | November 29, 2021 | # Identity-based policy examples for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces Identity-based policy examples By default, users and roles don't have permission to create or modify Refactor Spaces resources. To grant users permission to perform actions on the resources that they need, an IAM administrator can create IAM policies. To learn how to create an IAM identity-based policy by using these example JSON policy documents, see [Create IAM policies (console)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_create-console.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. For details about actions and resource types defined by Refactor Spaces, including the format of the ARNs for each of the resource types, see [Actions, resources, and condition keys for AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsmigrationhubrefactorspaces.html) in the *Service Authorization Reference*. **Topics** + [ ## Policy best practices ](#security_iam_service-with-iam-policy-best-practices) + [ ## Using the Refactor Spaces console ](#security_iam_id-based-policy-examples-console) + [ ## Allow users to view their own permissions ](#security_iam_id-based-policy-examples-view-own-permissions) ## Policy best practices Identity-based policies determine whether someone can create, access, or delete Refactor Spaces resources in your account. These actions can incur costs for your AWS account. When you create or edit identity-based policies, follow these guidelines and recommendations: + **Get started with AWS managed policies and move toward least-privilege permissions** – To get started granting permissions to your users and workloads, use the *AWS managed policies* that grant permissions for many common use cases. They are available in your AWS account. We recommend that you reduce permissions further by defining AWS customer managed policies that are specific to your use cases. For more information, see [AWS managed policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html#aws-managed-policies) or [AWS managed policies for job functions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_job-functions.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + **Apply least-privilege permissions** – When you set permissions with IAM policies, grant only the permissions required to perform a task. You do this by defining the actions that can be taken on specific resources under specific conditions, also known as *least-privilege permissions*. For more information about using IAM to apply permissions, see [ Policies and permissions in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + **Use conditions in IAM policies to further restrict access** – You can add a condition to your policies to limit access to actions and resources. For example, you can write a policy condition to specify that all requests must be sent using SSL. You can also use conditions to grant access to service actions if they are used through a specific AWS service, such as CloudFormation. For more information, see [ IAM JSON policy elements: Condition](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + **Use IAM Access Analyzer to validate your IAM policies to ensure secure and functional permissions** – IAM Access Analyzer validates new and existing policies so that the policies adhere to the IAM policy language (JSON) and IAM best practices. IAM Access Analyzer provides more than 100 policy checks and actionable recommendations to help you author secure and functional policies. For more information, see [Validate policies with IAM Access Analyzer](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-validation.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + **Require multi-factor authentication (MFA)** – If you have a scenario that requires IAM users or a root user in your AWS account, turn on MFA for additional security. To require MFA when API operations are called, add MFA conditions to your policies. For more information, see [ Secure API access with MFA](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_configure-api-require.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. For more information about best practices in IAM, see [Security best practices in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Using the Refactor Spaces console Using the console To access the AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces console, you must have a minimum set of permissions. These permissions must allow you to list and view details about the Refactor Spaces resources in your AWS account. If you create an identity-based policy that is more restrictive than the minimum required permissions, the console won't function as intended for entities (users or roles) with that policy. You don't need to allow minimum console permissions for users that are making calls only to the AWS CLI or the AWS API. Instead, allow access to only the actions that match the API operation that they're trying to perform. To ensure that users and roles can still use the Refactor Spaces console, also attach the Refactor Spaces `ConsoleAccess` or `ReadOnly` AWS managed policy to the entities. For more information, see [Adding permissions to a user](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_change-permissions.html#users_change_permissions-add-console) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Allow users to view their own permissions This example shows how you might create a policy that allows IAM users to view the inline and managed policies that are attached to their user identity. This policy includes permissions to complete this action on the console or programmatically using the AWS CLI or AWS API. ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "ViewOwnUserInfo", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "iam:GetUserPolicy", "iam:ListGroupsForUser", "iam:ListAttachedUserPolicies", "iam:ListUserPolicies", "iam:GetUser" ], "Resource": ["arn:aws:iam::*:user/${aws:username}"] }, { "Sid": "NavigateInConsole", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "iam:GetGroupPolicy", "iam:GetPolicyVersion", "iam:GetPolicy", "iam:ListAttachedGroupPolicies", "iam:ListGroupPolicies", "iam:ListPolicyVersions", "iam:ListPolicies", "iam:ListUsers" ], "Resource": "*" } ] } ``` # Troubleshooting AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces identity and access Troubleshooting Use the following information to help you diagnose and fix common issues that you might encounter when working with Refactor Spaces and IAM. **Topics** + [ ## I am not authorized to perform an action in Refactor Spaces ](#security_iam_troubleshoot-no-permissions) + [ ## I am not authorized to perform iam:PassRole ](#security_iam_troubleshoot-passrole) + [ ## I want to allow people outside of my AWS account to access my Refactor Spaces resources ](#security_iam_troubleshoot-cross-account-access) ## I am not authorized to perform an action in Refactor Spaces If the AWS Management Console tells you that you're not authorized to perform an action, then you must contact your administrator for assistance. Your administrator is the person that provided you with your sign-in credentials. The following example error occurs when the `mateojackson` IAM user tries to use the console to view details about a fictional `my-example-widget` resource but does not have the fictional `refactor-spaces:GetWidget` permissions. ``` User: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/mateojackson is not authorized to perform: refactor-spaces:GetWidget on resource: my-example-widget ``` In this case, Mateo asks his administrator to update his policies to allow him to access the `my-example-widget` resource using the `refactor-spaces:GetWidget` action. ## I am not authorized to perform iam:PassRole If you receive an error that you're not authorized to perform the `iam:PassRole` action, your policies must be updated to allow you to pass a role to Refactor Spaces. Some AWS services allow you to pass an existing role to that service instead of creating a new service role or service-linked role. To do this, you must have permissions to pass the role to the service. The following example error occurs when an IAM user named `marymajor` tries to use the console to perform an action in Refactor Spaces. However, the action requires the service to have permissions that are granted by a service role. Mary does not have permissions to pass the role to the service. ``` User: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/marymajor is not authorized to perform: iam:PassRole ``` In this case, Mary's policies must be updated to allow her to perform the `iam:PassRole` action. If you need help, contact your AWS administrator. Your administrator is the person who provided you with your sign-in credentials. ## I want to allow people outside of my AWS account to access my Refactor Spaces resources You can create a role that users in other accounts or people outside of your organization can use to access your resources. You can specify who is trusted to assume the role. For services that support resource-based policies or access control lists (ACLs), you can use those policies to grant people access to your resources. To learn more, consult the following: + To learn whether Refactor Spaces supports these features, see [How AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces works with IAM](security_iam_service-with-iam.md). + To learn how to provide access to your resources across AWS accounts that you own, see [Providing access to an IAM user in another AWS account that you own](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_common-scenarios_aws-accounts.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + To learn how to provide access to your resources to third-party AWS accounts, see [Providing access to AWS accounts owned by third parties](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_common-scenarios_third-party.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + To learn how to provide access through identity federation, see [Providing access to externally authenticated users (identity federation)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_common-scenarios_federated-users.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. + To learn the difference between using roles and resource-based policies for cross-account access, see [Cross account resource access in IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies-cross-account-resource-access.html) in the *IAM User Guide*. # Using service-linked roles for Refactor Spaces Using service-linked roles AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces uses AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM)[ service-linked roles](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_terms-and-concepts.html#iam-term-service-linked-role). A service-linked role is a unique type of IAM role that is linked directly to Refactor Spaces. Service-linked roles are predefined by Refactor Spaces and include all the permissions that the service requires to call other AWS services on your behalf. A service-linked role makes setting up Refactor Spaces easier because you don’t have to manually add the necessary permissions. Refactor Spaces defines the permissions of its service-linked roles, and unless defined otherwise, only Refactor Spaces can assume its roles. The defined permissions include the trust policy and the permissions policy, and that permissions policy cannot be attached to any other IAM entity. You can delete a service-linked role only after first deleting their related resources. This protects your Refactor Spaces resources because you can't inadvertently remove permission to access the resources. For information about other services that support service-linked roles, see [AWS Services That Work with IAM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html) and look for the services that have **Yes **in the **Service-Linked Role** column. Choose a **Yes** with a link to view the service-linked role documentation for that service. ## Service-linked role permissions for Refactor Spaces Refactor Spaces uses the service-linked role named **AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces** and associates it with the **MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy** IAM policy – Provides access to AWS resources managed or used by AWS Migration Hub Refactor Spaces. The AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces service-linked role trusts the following services to assume the role: + `refactor-spaces.amazonaws.com` The following is the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) for AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces. ``` arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/aws-service-role/refactor-spaces.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces ``` Refactor Spaces uses the **AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces** service-linked role when performing cross-account changes. This role must be present in your account to use Refactor Spaces. If it is not present, Refactor Spaces creates it during the following API calls: + `CreateEnvironment` + `CreateService` + `CreateApplication` + `CreateRoute` You must have `iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole` permissions to create the service-linked role. If the service-linked role doesn't exist in your account and cannot be created, the `Create` calls will fail. You must create the service-linked role in the IAM console before using Refactor Spaces, unless you are using the Refactor Spaces console. Refactor Spaces does not use the service-linked role when making changes in the current signed-in account. For example, when an application is created, Refactor Spaces updates all of the VPCs in the environment so that they can communicate with the newly added VPC. If the VPCs are in other accounts, Refactor Spaces uses the service-linked role and the `ec2:CreateRoute` permission to update the route tables in other accounts. To further expand on the create application example, when creating an application, Refactor Spaces updates the route tables that are in the virtual private cloud (VPC) provided in the `CreateApplication` call. This way, the VPC can communicate with other VPCs in the environment. The caller must have the `ec2:CreateRoute` permission that we use to update the route tables. This permission exists in the service-linked role, but Refactor Spaces does not use the service-linked role in the caller’s account to gain this permission. Instead, the caller must have the `ec2:CreateRoute` permission. Otherwise, the call fails. You cannot use the service-linked role to escalate your privileges. Your account must already have the permissions in the service-linked role to make the changes in the calling account. The `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess` managed policy, together with a policy that grants the extra required permissions, defines all of the necessary permissions to create Refactor Spaces resources. The service-linked role is a subset of these permissions that is used for specific cross-account calls. For more information about `AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess`, see [AWS managed policy: AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess](security-iam-awsmanpol.md#security-iam-awsmanpol-AWSMigrationHubRefactorSpacesFullAccess). ### Tags When Refactor Spaces creates resources in your account, they are tagged with the appropriate Refactor Spaces resource ID. For example, the Transit Gateway created from `CreateEnvironment` is tagged with the `refactor-spaces:environment-id` tag with the environment ID as the value. The API Gateway API created from `CreateApplication` is tagged with `refactor-spaces:application-id` with the application ID as the value. These tags allow Refactor Spaces to manage these resources. If you edit or remove the tags, Refactor Spaces can no longer update or delete the resource. ### MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy The role permissions policy named MigrationHubRefactorSpacesServiceRolePolicy allows Refactor Spaces to complete the following actions on the specified resources: Amazon API Gateway actions `apigateway:PUT` `apigateway:POST` `apigateway:GET` `apigateway:PATCH` `apigateway:DELETE` Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud actions `ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces` `ec2:DescribeRouteTables` `ec2:DescribeSubnets` `ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups` `ec2:DescribeVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations` `ec2:DescribeTransitGatewayVpcAttachments` `ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress` `ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupIngress` `ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup` `ec2:DeleteTransitGatewayVpcAttachment` `ec2:CreateRoute` `ec2:DeleteRoute` `ec2:DeleteTags` `ec2:DeleteVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations` AWS Resource Access Manager actions `ram:GetResourceShareAssociations` `ram:DeleteResourceShare` `ram:AssociateResourceShare` `ram:DisassociateResourceShare` Elastic Load Balancing; actions `elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetHealth` `elasticloadbalancing:DescribeListener` `elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetGroups` `elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets` `elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancerListeners` `elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener` `elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener` `elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup` `elasticloadbalancing:DeleteLoadBalancer` `elasticloadbalancing:DeregisterTargets` `elasticloadbalancing:AddTags` `elasticloadbalancing:CreateTargetGroup` The following is the full policy showing which resources the preceding actions apply to: ``` { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces", "ec2:DescribeRouteTables", "ec2:DescribeSubnets", "ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups", "ec2:DescribeVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "ec2:DescribeTransitGatewayVpcAttachments", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetHealth", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeListeners", "elasticloadbalancing:DescribeTargetGroups", "ram:GetResourceShareAssociations" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress", "ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupIngress", "ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup", "ec2:DeleteTransitGatewayVpcAttachment", "ec2:CreateRoute", "ec2:DeleteRoute", "ec2:DeleteTags", "ram:DeleteResourceShare", "ram:AssociateResourceShare", "ram:DisassociateResourceShare" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:environment-id": "false" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "ec2:DeleteVpcEndpointServiceConfigurations", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateLoadBalancerListeners", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringLike": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": [ "*" ] } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "apigateway:PUT", "apigateway:POST", "apigateway:GET", "apigateway:PATCH", "apigateway:DELETE" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/restapis/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags", "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/tags/*" ], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:application-id": "false" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "apigateway:GET", "Resource": "arn:aws:apigateway:*::/vpclinks/*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteLoadBalancer", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateListener" ], "Resource": ["arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:loadbalancer/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*", "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*"], "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteListener", "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:listener/net/refactor-spaces-nlb-*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DeleteTargetGroup", "elasticloadbalancing:RegisterTargets" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*" }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:DeregisterTargets" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:ResourceTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } }, { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "elasticloadbalancing:AddTags", "elasticloadbalancing:CreateTargetGroup" ], "Resource": "arn:*:elasticloadbalancing:*:*:targetgroup/refactor-spaces-tg-*", "Condition": { "Null": { "aws:RequestTag/refactor-spaces:route-id": "false" } } } ] } ``` You must configure permissions to allow an IAM entity (such as a user, group, or role) to create, edit, or delete a service-linked role. For more information, see [Service-Linked Role Permissions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/using-service-linked-roles.html#service-linked-role-permissions) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Creating a service-linked role for Refactor Spaces You don't need to manually create a service-linked role. When you create Refactor Spaces environment, application, service, or route resources in the AWS Management Console, the AWS CLI, or the AWS API, Refactor Spaces creates the service-linked role for you. For more information about creating a service-linked role for Refactor Spaces, see [Service-linked role permissions for Refactor Spaces](#slr-permissions). If you delete this service-linked role, and then need to create it again, you can use the same process to recreate the role in your account. When you create Refactor Spaces environment, application, service, or route resources, Refactor Spaces creates the service-linked role for you again. ## Editing a service-linked role for Refactor Spaces Refactor Spaces does not allow you to edit the AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces service-linked role. After you create a service-linked role, you cannot change the name of the role because various entities might reference the role. However, you can edit the description of the role using IAM. For more information, see [Editing a Service-Linked Role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/using-service-linked-roles.html#edit-service-linked-role) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Deleting a service-linked role for Refactor Spaces If you no longer need to use a feature or service that requires a service-linked role, we recommend that you delete that role. That way you don’t have an unused entity that is not actively monitored or maintained. However, you must clean up the resources for your service-linked role before you can manually delete it. **Note** If the Refactor Spaces service is using the role when you try to delete the resources, then the deletion might fail. If that happens, wait for a few minutes and try the operation again. To delete the Refactor Spaces resources used by AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces, use the Refactor Spaces console to delete the resources, or use the delete API operations for the resources. For more information about the delete API operations, see [Refactor Spaces API Reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com//migrationhub-refactor-spaces/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html). **To manually delete the service-linked role using IAM** Use the IAM console, the AWS CLI, or the AWS API to delete the AWSServiceRoleForMigrationHubRefactorSpaces service-linked role. For more information, see [Deleting a Service-Linked Role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/using-service-linked-roles.html#delete-service-linked-role) in the *IAM User Guide*. ## Supported Regions for Refactor Spaces service-linked roles Refactor Spaces supports using service-linked roles in all of the Regions where the service is available. For more information, see [AWS Regions and Endpoints](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/rande.html).